E.—No. 7a

to give colour to their suspicions. But we cannot look for any very hearty or zealous support from the Natives of our cause for its own sake. With the imperfect sympathy, which is the best we can expect from them in any cause but their own for the conflict, it is not surprising that such circumstances should occasionally occur. Undoubtedly it sometimes happens that while a native chief and the majority of his tribe are well inclined to us, and intend to be faithful, there may be some malcontents among his followers, too few to influence the whole of the tribe, but too independent to restrain the expression of their feelings, or perhaps to abstain altogether from acts of a dubious character, even amounting to occasional collision or tampering with the enemy. It has been accordingly proposed sometimes, as the safest course, to reject the assistance of the friendly Natives altogether, to expel them from our towns, shut them out beyond our lines, and treat them and our open foes with the same rigour, distrust, and enmity. This seems to the Colonial Secretary neither just nor expedient. Some men who have freely and generously exposed their lives in our battles, or on other occasions, to save the lives of individuals among our countrymen, would have to be classed among these enemies, and treated accordingly. Naturally this treatment would turn them and their followers into our bitterest foes, and give disaffected Natives a good handle for their taunts against all who were weak enough to put faith in us. There are other Natives again, like Waata Kututai and Wiremu Te Wheoro, whose advocacy of the Government has been so open, active, and continued, that it has become a matter of pride with them to carry their point against their opponents, even though it necessitated the taking up arms against them. It seems better that men like these should be regarded as friends and trusted in as allies, than by neglect or ingratitude turned into foes. At the same time, English Officers acquainted with them, their language, and habits of thought and action, should be placed permanently beside or over them, who would thus easily come to a knowledge of their opinions and intentions from day to day, and be ablo to give timely notice if any symptoms of disaffection appeared amongst them. If this mode of treatment merely secured their neutrality, it would be sufficient to justify its adoption, to say nothing of the advantage of depriving our enemies of the strong ground against us an opposite course would supply. The Native Minister has already sent in a plan for the organization of the friendly tribes at Taranaki into several companies, with the names of Native and European officers, and suggestions as to their pay and location respectively, in order to render them auxiliary to the defence of the settlement, or to the operations of the troops in that Province. With respect to one tribe, and that the most important of those who are considered friendly to us —the Ngapuhi,—the Colonial Secretary has one remark to make. The propriety of bringing a body of them down to Taranaki, to act in concert with us against the tribe of that name, and the Ngatiruanui, has frequently been discussed of late. The measure, no doubt, has much to recommend it; and if the Ngapuhi were promised, as they reasonably and fairly ought to be, that any land they might conquer should belong to them ; or, if they were inclined to sell it, be bought by us of them, no doubt the proffered reward would greatly increase their already existing inclination to become our effective allies. But, as it is probable that hostilities may before long break out in Waikato, it appears to the Colonial Secretary that it would be better to hold in reserve the employment of these powerful allies until that occasion arises. Their jealousy of the usurpation of a sort of sovereignty over the other tribes by the Waikato in setting up their king, is a feeling probably easy to be worked upon, and one which may fairly be taken advantage of. And if the insurgents in Waikato were once suppressed, the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki and our Southern opponents would either fall along with them, or be easily dealt with. 3. The third means of defence is the Militia, including the Volunteers. The Colonial Secretary recommends that a proper proportion of the Militia be immediately called out into active service, in all the settlements of tho Northern Island. This has already been done in Taranaki, and five hundred men are employed in the occupation of blockhouses, and in nightly patrols and pickets about the town. Should it be found necessary eventually to withdraw the troops from Tataraimaka, and contract the lines of defence around New Plymouth, the number of Militia kept on permanent pay might be reduced. It is not advisable to call out less than 500 men at Hawke's Bay, 500 at Whanganui, 1,000 at Wellington, and 1,500 at Auckland. Most of the towns of New Zealand (excepting Auckland) are built in such a manner that if the object had been to make their defence impossible, human ingenuity could scarcely have devised a better mode of doing so than the plan of building actually adopted. Houses, generally of weatherboards, are built as wide apart, and scattered over as great an extent of open land, as is compatible with their being considered a collection of dwellings (in other words, a town or village,) at all. The mode of defence adopted at New Plymouth (a town of this sort) is the erection of blockhouses, on commanding sites, around the central portion of the town, in which the buildings are least dispersed. Within the line of defence so constructed Natives probably would not be very ready to venture, as their retreat might be cut off in many directions. But if they were determined, and made a rush, they might obviously commit much havoc before they could be arrested. Against such a contingency, it is possible that a number of soldiers and Militia, sufficent to patrol different parts of the town at once, and at all hours, might be found an adequate security. It is suggested, however, that certain of the houses in various parts of the town, and in the best positions to command the streets, and the open spaces between them, should be rendered ball-proof, and pierced with loop-holes, and be used as stations for Militia and Volunteers, who might thus cover with their fire almost every Bpace or open gound by which an enemy might enter.

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